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THE NONRESIDENT PUPIL-A PUBLIC
SCHOOL CONTROVERSY

I. INTRODUCTION

Recently the nonresident pupil, seeking admission to a
public school district other than his own, has become the
center of a legal and administrative public school controversy The advent of accelerated school reorganization,
which radically changed school district lines, and the greatly
increased state financial aid on a per-pupil basis, resulting
in an incentive to maintain resident pupils, has drawn focus
on the nonresident pupil. Consequently, the courts have
been called upon to interpret legislation and to determine
policy in an area that has been relatively without judicial
review since Statehood.
The center of the controversy has evolved around a confusing statute,' regarding elementary nonresident tuition,
which has been interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in contradictory opinions. 2 The 1963 opinion has
virtually eliminated the nonresident pupil. Parents, therefore, except in cases of closer distance, convenience, 3 or
agreement of the school boards, 4 must send their children
to the school district of their residence, and are barred from
sending them elsewhere even if they are willing to pay the
tuition charges. This ruling has left many nonresident pupils
stranded in legal uncertainty, and has challenged the concept of "an equally free, open and accessible" public
education. 5
The questions raised by this controversy are: (1) who
has the power to decide whether a child can enter another
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08(14) (Supp. 1963).
Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist., 122 N.W.2d
2.
Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d
(N.D. 1963)

(N.D. 1958).
3. Supra note 1.
4.
5.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08(3) (Supp. 1963).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-01 (1960).
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school district, (2) on what basis can he be admitted,
(3) who shall pay the cost of his tuition, and (4) what rate
of tuition must be set? Since the administration of schools
is strictly bound by legislative enactment, 6 for any answers
we must first look to the statutes governing the nonresident
pupil.

II.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 proclaimed that schools
and the means of education should forever be encouragedJ thus establishing the foundation for a system of free
public education in the United States. The North Dakota
Constitution, article VIII, section 147, gave the legislative
assembly the mandate to:
make provisions for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools which
shall be open to all children of the state of North
Dakota and free from sectarian control.
This single sentence provides the framework for the complex
system of education that has developed in North Dakota.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in 1931, defined the Legislature's mandate as being unrestricted in its performance
and including the "power to enact any legislation in regard
to the conduct, control, and regulation of the public free
schools which does not deny to the citizen the constitutional right to enjoy life and liberty and to pursue happiness
and to acquire property "8
Therefore, it is the historical policy of North Dakota, in
common with the policy of every other state in the Union,
to maintain a free public school system for the benefit of
all children within specified age limits. 9 The North Dakota
Legislature has provided in section 15-47-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code that "The public schools of the state
shall be equally free, open, and accessible at all times to
6.

Gillespie v.

Common School Dist. No. 8, McClean

216 N.W 564, 565 (1927).
7. U.S.C. vol. 1, at XXXVII
8.

County, 56 N.D.

194,

(1959).

Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W

477, 479

(1931).

9. Batty v. Board of Educ. of City of Williston, 67 N.D. 6, 269 NW 49, 50
(1936)
Anderson v. Breithbarth, 67 N.D. 709, 245 N.W 483, 484 (1932).
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all children between the ages of six and twenty-one.
"
It should be noted that prior to 1943 this privilege applied
only to children "residing in the district." 10
The courts have made it clear that the Legislature has
strict control over the public schools and that local school
boards are without common-law powers. 12 "School Officers
have and may exercise only such powers as are expressly
or impliedly granted by statute' '1 3 and in defining these
powers, the rule of strict construction applies.14 It therefore follows that in determining pupil rights, we are dealing
with a legislative privilege rather than an absolute right.

III.

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

GOVERNING

THE

NONRESIDENT PUPIL

In 196115 the Legislature consolidated school laws by eliminating the Special, 16 Common,' 7 Independent,'
and Joint
School District 9 designations and created the Public School
District Law 20 which governs all districts except the Fargo
School District.2 1 The general powers and duties of the
school boards are found in section 15-29-08 of the North Da10.
Compare 1925 Supp., ch. 12, § 1343, with N.D. Rev. Code § 15-4701 (1943).
The words "residing in the district" were omitted in the 1943 code revision and
have not since been re-inserted. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-01 (1960).
11. Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist., supra note 2, at 819.
12.
Seher V. Woodlawn School Dist. No. 26, 79 N.D. 818, 59 N.W.2d 805, 809
(1953)
see also McWlthy v. Heart River School Dist. No. 22, 79 N.D. 744,
749, 32 N.W.2d 886, 889 (1948)
Batty v. Board of Educ. of City of Williston,
67 N.D. 6, 269 N.W 49 (1936)
State ex rel. Mannes v. Alquist, 59 N.D. 762,
231 N.W 952 (1930)
Gillespie v. Common School Dist., 56 N.D. 194, 216 N.W
564 (1927)
Rhea v. Board of Educ., 41 N.D. 449, 171 N.W 103 (1919)
State
ex rel. School Dist. v. Tucher, 39 N.D. 106, 166 N.W 820 (1918)
Pronovost v.
Brunette, 36 N.D. 288, 162 N.W 300 (1917)
Kretchmer v. School Bd., 34 N.D.
403, 158 N.W 993 (1916).
13. Gillespie v. Common School Dist. No. 8, 56 N.D. 194, 216 N.W 564, 565
(1927).
14.
Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist, supra note 2, at
820
Seher v. Woodlawn School Dist. No. 26, supra note 12, at 809 see Lang v.
Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 228 N.W 819 (1930)
Stern v. City of Fargo, 18 N.D. 289,
122 N.W 403 (1909).
15. N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158.
16. N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158, § 1 (formerly N.D. CENT. CODE, § 15-28,
15-29 (1960).
17. N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158, § 89 (formerly N.D. CENT. CODE, § 15-23,
15-24, 15-25 (1960)).
18. N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158, § 89 (formerly N.D. CENT. CODE, § 15-30,
15-31, 15-32 (1960).
19.
N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158, § 89 (formerly N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-33
1960)).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 15-27, 15-28, 15-29 (Supp. 1963).
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kota Century Code. 22 Subsection 3 provides for the sending
of "pupils into another district when, because of shorter
distances and other conveniences, it is to the best interest
of the school district to do so," in which case the sending
board will make arrangements with the receiving board for
the payment of tuition. The nonresident pupil controversy
rests mainly on the powers of a school board to admit a
pupil from another district other than through the arrangement provided in subsection 3. Subsection 14 provides for
such admissions, and states in part:
To admit to the schools of the district pupils from
other districts when it can be done without injuring or overcrowding the schools, and to make regulations for the admission of such pupils. The board
may make proper and necessary rules for the
assignment and distribution of pupils to and among
the schools in the district and for their transfer
When an elementary
from one school to another
pupil is admitted from another district, credit on
his tuition shall be given by the district admitting
him to the extent of school taxes paid in the admitting district by the parent or guardian of the
admitted pupil. If the attendance of an elementary
pupil from another district is necessitated by shorter
distance or other reasons of convenience, approval
or disapproval shall be given by a three-member
committee consisting of the county judge, state's
attorney and the county superintendent of schools
23

24
is
The provision for nonresident high school students
similar to the elementary school statute cited above except
that if the three-member county committee should disapprove
the payment of tuition to a receiving district, the parent may
appeal the decision to the State Board of Public School Education. 25 The high school statute also has an additional
criterion for the committee to use in determining whether

21.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-27-01 (Supp. 1963).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08 (Supp. 196i).
(Supp. 1963).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08(14)
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-40-17 (Supp. 1963).
25.
See School Bd. of Eagle Pub. School Dist. No. 16 v.
Educ., 126 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1964).

22.

State Rd. of Pub.
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they will approve nonresident tuition payments,
"previous attendance in another high school. ' 26
IV

FACTORS

CONTRIBUTING

TO
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which

is

THE NONRESIDENT

PUPIL PROBLEM

It is not within the scope of this note to trace the
entire development of the Public School Law, but rather to
explore the factors leading up to the present nonresident
pupil problem. Two historical developments provide the setting for this problem. The first is the system of state financing of public schools, and the second is the recent trend
toward school reorganization.
"North Dakota state aids trace their origin prior to
statehood and were a condition for admission to statehood
statehood and were a condition for admission to statehood.
The enabling act of 1889 to create North and South
Dakota from Dacotah Territory required that Section Number 16 and 36 in every township be retained for the support
of public schools." 2 At first, the state aid was small, but
it has grown until it now represents a major part of the
local school district budget.
School financing today is primarily based on the Foundation Program which was established by the 1959 Legislature26
after two years of study by the Legislative Research Committee. 29 This program guaranteed 60 per cent of the state
average per pupil cost of education to every school district
in the state with the balance of forty per cent to be carried
by the local district. 30 Since monies from the County
Equalization Fund for school finance follow the pupil, 31 the
admission or nonadmission of a nonresident pupil into a dis26. Ib d.
27. Howard J. Snortland, A Proposed Foundation Program of State Support
for Public Education sn North Dakota, Unpublished Master's Thesis, University
Howard J. Snortland is
Library, University of North Dakota, p. 60 (1958)
presently Director of Finance and Statistics of the North Dakota Department
of Public Instruction.
28. N.D. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 170.
REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, 1959,
29.
at 17.
30. Id. at 3.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-40-14 (Supp. 1963).
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trict becomes very important to both the receiving district
and the home district as it represents either an increase or
a decrease in state aid.
Reorganization of school districts progressed very slowly
until 195732 at which time the Legislature modified the method
of voting, 33 and for the first time charged high school tuition
to non-high school districts.3 4 Prior to this act, districts
without a high school had no direct financial responsibility
for students attending adjoining high school districts. These
districts now had a financial stake in high schools and,
therefore, to gain voice and vote, sought annexation with a
high school district. The advent of a liberal state program
of aid for transportation in 195935 as well as mandatory high
school attendance until graduation or the sixteenth birthday"
furthered the desirability of reorganization.
School reorganization resulted in better schools and provided greater opportunity for learning. Where districts were
slow to reorganize, the new schools in adjoining districts
were tempting to parents forced to send their children to
inferior schools. Often parents, having fought on the losing
side of a reorganization battle, would attempt to send their
children to another school district. Districts would also
"pirate" pupils from adjoining districts to obtain the additional state school aid that follows the pupils 37 or to encourage reorganization. These factors created the nonresi-

32.

School District Reorganization Elections in North Dakota
Approved
Rejected

27
44

69
64

1958
1959
1960
1961

57
41
38
15

12
9
7
1

69
50
45
16

July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962

11

3

14

July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963

5

1

6

229

104

333

July
July
July
July

1,
1,
1,
1,

1957
1958
1959
1960

to
to
to
to

June
June
June
June

30,
30,
30,
30,

Source. REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, M. F
intendent, Bismarck, North Dakota.

33.
34.
1963).
35.
(Supp.
36.
37.

Total

42
20

to June 30, 1951
July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1957

Peterson, Super-

N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 145, § 1 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-53-14 (1960).
N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 140, § 2 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-40-17 (Supp.
N.D. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 170 N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 15-40, 15-56, 57-15
1963).
N.D. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 159, § 1 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34-01 (1960).
Supra note 31.
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dent pupil problem
and the courts.
V

which,

today,

faces

the

Legislature

THE KESSLER OPINION

Prior to the large influx of reorganization plans in 1957,8
the nonresident pupil had not been a difficult problem for
the courts. In 1932, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided
what constituted residency for school purposes. Residency
was declared not synonymous with domicile or legal voting
residence, rather'Residing in the district' means what it says-a
child who makes its home in that particular district, whether with its parents or with other persons, when that place is the only home it has, a
place to which she comes and where she remains
when not 'called elsewhere for labor or special or
temporary purposes' 39
The Supreme Court has also stated that the nonresident
pupil can only be admitted when facilities for seating and
instruction are available 4 0 and that the school board cannot
41
be compelled to admit children from adjacent districts.
An admitting district cannot charge the sending district for
42
more than four years of high school tuition for any pupil,
and for any additional attendance it would appear that the
43
pupil himself must meet the tuition demand.
On September 3, 1957, Linda Kessler of Germantown
Township of Wells County registered to attend the eighth
grade of the Special School District of the City of Fessenden.
When she came to attend classes on the morning of September
4, 1957, she was denied admission and returned to her home
by the superintendent of the Fessenden School. The reason
given for this refusal to admit Linda was that she resided in
38. Supra note 32.
89. Anderson v. Breithbarth, 62 N.D. 714, 245 N.W. 483, 487 (1932).
40. Todd v. Board of Educ. of City of Williston, 54 N.D. 235, 209 N.W 369
(1926).
41. State ex rel. Johnson v. Mostad, 34 N.D. 330, 158 N.W 349, 350 (1916).
42. Batty v. Board of Educ. of City of Williston, 67 N.D. 6, 269 N.W 49,
51 (1936).
43. REP. ATT'Y GEN. N.D., 1958-1960, at 196, 197.
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a district where a petition for annexation was circulated and
rejected; and, therefore, pursuant to a resolution passed by
the Fessenden School Board, she could not be admitted.
Linda's father who had sought the greater opportunity offered by the larger Fessenden School for his daughter, rather
than the township school of his district having less than 10
pupils in attendance, sought a writ of mandamus compelling
the Fessenden School to admit his child pursuant to the provisions of section 15-2908, North Dakota Revised Code of441943,
as amended by chapter 134 of the 1957 Session Laws.
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Judge
Rittgers presiding, granted the writ and required that the
Fessenden School District admit Linda as provided by section 15-2908. 4 5 The Court, in construing this elementary nonresident tuition statute, rebuked the Legislature by pointing
out that:
The person or group which prepared this statute
certainly did not have the services of any experts
in the use of the English language. The law is carelessly drawn, there is a mixture of subjects and
which is very
sentences jumbled together in a form
46
difficult to analyze and understand.
The question centered on whether the permission of the
three-member committee is a prerequisite to any attendance
by a nonresident pupil. The District Court admitted that
"Such construction appears at first glance to be reasonable.
Taking the language of the statute literally, and without considering the history of the law, it might reasonably be held
to mean that before a pupil could be admitted to a school
other than that of this residence approval must first be received- from the three-member committee. '47 The Court,
however, reasoned that:
it has been the policy of our State Legislature
to broaden and liberalize the school laws of this
State
[and] there has been a continual lessen44. Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.
1958).
45. Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, Fourth Dist. N.D., Sept.
17, 1957.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Ibid.
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ing of the control of the school boards over the
reception of pupils from other districts. This is
evidenced by the change in the words of 'may' to
'shall' in several places. This process has continued
until the present laws have entirely removed from
the school boards any right to refuse reception of
a pupil when the pupil could be received 'without
injuring or over-crowding the schools' 4
The three-member committee provided in the statute, therefore, is only to decide the question of whether the sending
district rather than the parents will pay the tuition because
such attendance is necessitated by "shorter distance or convenience." Judge Rittgers, in accordance with his construction, redrafted the statute and divided it into two separate
paragraphs as follows:
15-29082. Admission of Pupils From Other Districts; Tuition.
The payment of tuition to such receiving
district, sufficient to warrant admission, shall be
governed as follows:
(1) When the tuition for the pupil seeking admission to such school is paid by or on behalf of such
pupil.
(2) If it is sought to require the district of the
pupil's residence to pay such tuition, and it is claimed
on behalf of such pupil that his attendance from
another district is necessitated by shorter distance
of travel or other reasons of convenience, then and
for that purpose the approval or disapproval of the
application shall be given by a three member com49
mittee
The Supreme Court, in January of 1958,50 upheld the
District Court opinion, and agreeing with Judge Rittgers'
statutory construction, stated:
Thus it is clear that the subsection deals with two
separate matters. The first sentence deals exclusively with the obligation of the receiving district
48.
49.
50.

Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, supra note 45, at 7.
Ibid.
Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, supra note 44.

1964]

NOTES

to admit the pupil. The remainder of the section
deals with the liability of the home district for tuition when the attendance of the pupil outside of
his home district involves reasons of convenience.5 1
Thus if approval is not obtained, then the
to
district from which the pupil comes is not obligated
52
pay tuition to the district receiving the pupil.
is still under the
[T]he receiving district
duty to admit the child if it can be done without
injuring or overcrowding the school, but the party
responsible for the education of the pupil would have
to procure the approval of the committee before the
school district of his residence is obligated to pay the
betuition. If he cannot procure such approval 5he
3
comes personally obligated to pay the tuition.
Judge Burke, dissenting, analyzed the various amendments to section 15-2908 and concluded that the 1955 amendment that changed the language from "and is approved by
the county superintendent of schools" to "approval or disapproval shall be given by the county superintendent of
schools" meant that:
in the original statute the county superintendent's approval was a condition essential to fix liability for payment of tuition and in the amended
statute it became a condition essential to the absolute
right to attend school in 5 a4 school district in which the
pupil was not a resident.
Aside from the dissent, the Kessler case had settled three
of the questions involving the nonresident pupil. The receiving district had to admit a nonresident pupil if it could be
done without injuring or overcrowding the school, and, secondly, the sending district would only be responsible for the
tuition of the pupil, if for reasons of convenience, approval
was granted by the three-member committee. Thirdly, the
decision established the obligation of the pupil or his parents
to pay if such approval was not received by the threemember committee. This obligation had been implied from
51.

52.
53.
54.

at 750.
Id. at 751.
Ibid.
Id. at 755.
Id.
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other statutes 55 by the Attorney General 56 prior to this decision.
VI.

THE MYHRE CASE

The remaining question, regarding the amount of tuition
to be charged nonresident pupils, was answered by the Supreme Court when it decided the Myhre case.7 Selmer Myhre
and others had sought a restraining order to stop North Central School District No. 10 of Richland County from allegedly
soliciting resident students of Eagle Public School District
and promising the parents of such school children transportation and tuition at little or no cost.58 A writ of mandamus was sought commanding the school district to collect,
or to resort to every legal means to try to collect, tuition
fees and bus transportation costs provided by law from the
parents and guardians of nonresident pupils. 59 The receiving school district had contended that it was not necessary
to charge the nonresident pupil full tuition equal to the county
average when they were not overcrowded and the monies received from the state on a per-pupil basis were nearly sufficient to meet the increased costs of the nonresident pupil.
In 1962, Judge Schneller, in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District sitting in Richland County, decided that it
was not necessary for an agreement to be reached between
the sending and receiving districts in order to admit non60
resident pupils unless the home district is to pay the tuition.
The Kessler case is cited in support of the conclusion that
the district has the power to admit nonresident pupils if it
will not injure or overcrowd the admitting school, and that
"parents or parties in charge of school students have a perfect right to send the pupil to any school of their choice so
55. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-40-16 (1960), 15-40-17, 15-29-08(14) (Supp. 1963).
56. Supra note 43 (1956-1958) REP. ATT'Y GEN. N.D. 1956-58, at 173, 174, 179.
57. Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist., 122 N.W.2d 816
(N.D.1963).
58. Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist. No. 7671, Third
Dist. N.D., Jan. 19, 1962.
59. Supra note 57.
60. The School Bd. of Eagle Pub. School Dist. No. 16 of Richland County v.
The School Bd. of North Cent. School Dist. No. 10 of Richland County, No.
7669, Third Dist. N.D., Jan. 19, 1962.
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long as they individually pay for the transportation and tuition fees." 6' 1
As to the amount of tuition to be charged, the District
Court cited sections 15-40-17, 15-40-26 and 15-29-08 (14) of the
North Dakota Century Code and concluded:
[I]t is my opinion that the defendant district
must charge the parents or parties having charge
of nonresident high school students the average cost
of high school education per child in Richland
County, and in the case of elementary school students
the tuition charge shall not exceed the average cost
of elementary education per child in the county
The only reasonable interpretation that can be given
the tuition charge for nonresident elementary school
students is that it should be the average cost per
pupil of maintaining the school in which the student
attends if such cost does not exceed the county
average. There is no valid reason why the defendant school board should not collect from the parents
or parties in charge of nonresident elementary school
students the same amount as the average cost6 2per
student of maintaining their elementary school.
Judge Strutz handed down the opinion for the Supreme
Court on May 29, 1963. The portions of section 15-40-17 and
15-29-08(14) of the North Dakota Century Code referred to in
the District Court opinion were again cited and the trial
court decision regarding the amount of tuition to be charged
was accepted. The Court further pointed out that "No provision is made, in either case, for payment of tuition by the
parents of such non-resident children. ' 63 Statutes in force
prior to 1961,
although they did allow the school board to
permit children who were not residents to attend the
schools of the district, upon such terms and conditions 'as the board may prescribe' and gave to the
board authority to fix and collect tuition, the statutes
did not provide that such tuition should be paid by
the district from which such pupils were admitted.64
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist., supra note 57, at 820.
Ibid.
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With this statement the Court distinguished the Myhre case
from former situations. What the Court meant by the reference to tuition being "paid by the district" is certainly unclear because this language has been included in section
15-29-08(14) of the North Dakota Century Code since its inception in 1949,65 and in section 15-40-17 of the North Dakota
Century Code since 1957 66
Without reference to the Kessler opinion, the Court proceeded to construe the same statute interpreted by the
Kessler case. Similar to Judge Burke's dissent in that case,
the Court concluded that no student could attend another district unless an agreement had been reached between the
school boards or permission had been granted by the threemember committee, consisting of the county judge, the state's
attorney, and the county superintendent of schools, for rea67
sons of convenience.
Upon a "vigorous" petition for rehearing, 6 the Kessler
opinion was brought to the attention of the Court. The Court
denied the petition and declared that "the decision in the
Kessler case is no longer applicable." 69 The Court reasoned
that the Kessler opinion was based on 15-29082 of the North
Dakota Revised Code of 1943, as amended by chapter 134 of
the 1957 Session Laws, which was wiped out by the 1961 Legislature which enacted chapter 158 of the 1961 Session Laws.
Section 1 of that chapter provides that several
chapters of the North Dakota Century Code, including Chapter 15-29, 'are hereby amended and re-en' Then follows a comacted to read as follows:
plete re-enactment of Chapter 15-29. Such amendment and re-enactment wiped out Section 15-29-08.2
of the North Dakota Century Code, since it had been
a part of Chapter 15-29. 11
The Court concluded that "the decision in the Kessler case
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

N.D. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 143, § 3.
N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 140, § 2.
Myhre v. School Bd. of North Cent. Pub. School Dist., supra note 57.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 822.
Ibzd.
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no longer is the law since it is based on a statute no longer
' 71
in existence."
It was within the Court's power to overrule the Kessler
opinion either explicitly or implicitly, but rather it stated
that the case was "inapplicable" because of the statutory
change. The statutory change referred to was the passage
of the Education Act of the 1961 Legislative Session. 72 This
act, as discussed previously, consolidated the several school
district laws into one Public School District Law
With
minor wording changes to comply with the new district designations, the section construed by the Kessler case is carried
over into the new law in exactly the same language, and
is the present 15-29-08 (14) of the North Dakota Century
Code. The "Kessler" construction, that the statute deals with
two separate subjects-the power of the school board to admit
nonresident pupils and the payment of tuition for elementary
pupils-would still appear to be applicable. Section 15-40-17
of the North Dakota Century Code covering nonresident high
school students has remained virtually unchanged since 1957
Legislative intent of the North Dakota Legislature is generally difficult to determine due to the lack of records of
committee action and floor debates. The 1961 Education Act,
however, was introduced by the Legislative Research Committee which described its purpose as:
The Committee agreed that the purpose of its
deliberations was to consolidate presently existing
law, and not to create new school district law Some
small provisions have been inserted into the proposed bill which may have no direct counterpart
in present law, but only where it is necessary to do
so in order to more easily obtain uniformity of
procedures, authority, or duties. It attempted to
make no other substantive change even where 7it3
realized that present law could be improved upon.

71.
72.

Ibid.
N.D. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 158.

73.

REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE,

at 7.

1961,
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CONCLUSION

It would appear that the Myhre opinion was contrary to
the intent of the 1961 Legislature and that the "Kessler" construction was assumed by the drafters of the Education Act
to follow the statute in question into the new law However,
one cannot be too critical of the Myhre decision when we
remember the admonition given the Legislature by Judge
Rittgers for a poorly drafted statute, and the dissent of Judge
Burke in the Kessler case.
The result of the Myhre decision is threefold. First, from
a public policy standpoint, it will encourage reorganization
and stop school district "pirating" of pupils. Second, it has
left nonresident pupils already admitted within the "Kessler"
interpretation of the statute stranded in legal uncertainty
Finally, it should serve as a mandate to the 1965 Legislature
to make a clear determination of what the policy is going to
be concerning the nonresident pupil.
It is the opinion of the writer that Judge Rittgers'
opinion and the Kessler case represent the proper construction of the nonresident pupil statutes in light of the basic
principle established by the Legislature that the schools
shall be "equally free, open and accessible" to all pupils.
Education of a child is a personal endeavor, and parents
should always have the privilege of sending their children to
another district, providing, it will not overcrowd or injure the
receiving school and they are willing to pay the tuition.
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